Introduction

'Ethnopragmatics' and cross-cultural semantics
I use the term 'ethnopragmatics' to refer to explanations of speech practices which begin with culture-internal ideas, i.e. with the shared values, norms, priorities, and assumptions of the speakers, rather than with any presumed universals of pragmatics.
Ethnopragmatics (sometimes called cross-cultural pragmatics 1 ) is characterised by a concern with cultural particularity, and typically produces highly specific and fine-grained descriptions (cf. Wierzbicka 1991 Wierzbicka , 2002 Goddard 1992 Goddard , 2000 ). In this paper I argue that active metaphor, far from being a universal and natural feature of human language, is a culture-specific phenomenon which can only be properly understood in an ethnopragmatic perspective.
Of particular importance to sound ethnopragmatic methodology is the need to avoid terminological ethnocentrism in the metalanguage of description and analysis, and this means, among other things, that the term 'metaphor' itself cannot be taken for granted. As an artefact of a particular cultural tradition with its origins in classical Greek rhetoric, this word encapsulates a complex meaning which lacks precise equivalents in many, probably most, of the world's languages. It would be ethnocentric to uncritically adopt such a category as a starting point for cross-cultural comparison. This point is not necessarily affected by the fact that the term 'metaphor' can be given various technical or theoryinternal meanings. What really matters is whether our theoretical starting points can be mind. To see this, consider this quotation from Winner and Gardner's (1993: 426) paper on metaphor and irony.
[F]ull comprehension of nonliteral utterances entails not only constructing the speaker's meaning, but also keeping in mind the literal sentence meaning and hearing the contrast between what is said and what is meant... Only with metalinguistic awareness does the listener recognise and appreciate the metaphoricity or irony of the nonliteral utterance. Only at this level do nonliteral utterances feel different (and hence function differently) from literal ones.
Winner and Gardner add that they do not mean that the speaker's meaning is necessarily PROCESSED any differently than with a literal utterance. It is a matter, rather, of grasping or hearing the utterance as different from just 'plain talk'. Winner and Gardner (1993) are saying makes a lot of sense. Notice, however, that they are using the expression 'metalinguistic awareness' in a deliberately broad way-to designate an awareness of a contrast between what is said and what is meant. This is because they want to encompass both irony and metaphor under the same metalinguistic umbrella. Equally, however, the authors stress that we need to DISTINGUISH metaphor from irony. How can this be done? Essentially, the difference hinges on the difference between what is said (the content) and the words in which something is said (lexical form). Speaking ironically, one says something which one does not mean, intending the listener to realise this. Producing an active metaphor, however, one says certain words outside their usual uses, in a way which draws attention to the words themselves. The dissonance is a mismatch, or potential mismatch, between the form of what is said and the speaker's intended or inferred meaning. For this particular kind of metalinguistic awareness, a more specialised term is needed: 'metalexical awareness'.
In my view, what
Aside from active metaphor, other phenomena which involve metalexical awareness are proverbs, aphorism, riddles, quotations, slogans, verse, song, and punning: all phenomena which involve the preservation of "the very words" (cf. Olson and Hildyard 1983) .
The idea of 'metalexical awareness' links in very well with a linguistic test (or partial test) for active metaphors which has been proposed by Andrzej Bogus¬awski (1994) . The proposed test relies on the existence of expressions like the following, in which the speaker directly comments on his or her choice of words: so to speak, as it were, if you like, speaking metaphorically. When expressions like these occur (as they do fairly frequently in conversation, oral narrative and journalism; cf. Moon (1998: 305-6 )), they can be taken as overt evidence of the speaker's metalexical awareness. They directly index a speaker's awareness of the unusual nature of the word usage. Bogus¬awski's proposal is that the POTENTIAL to co-occur with such phrases can be used as test for identifying active metaphors 4 . I will refer to this as the 'metalexical tag test'. This test would identify the expressions in (1) as active metaphors, while disallowing those in (2). Intuitively this seems the correct result, if we allow that active metaphors need not be particularly novel, as previously discussed.
(1) Language is, so to speak, the mirror of the mind.
Unemployment is a contagious disease, as it were.
The past is, metaphorically speaking, a foreign country. It goes without saying that adding a metalexical tag degrades the stylistic effect of the metaphors in (1), but this is not pertinent to the proposed test.
Developing an ethnopragmatic script for active metaphorising
To characterise different varieties of figurative language within the NSM metalanguage one must draw, above all, on the semantic primes SAY and WORDS, and on their associated grammar 5
. Consider the sentences in (3a)-(3c) below. These, it is claimed, represent three grammatical possibilities (valency options) of the semantic prime SAY. The meanings expressed by these sentences, according to the NSM hypothesis, should be sayable in any language. That is, once we locate the lexical equivalent of SAY in a language, one should be able to use this element (or a variant) to specify an addressee and also a locutionary topic, as in (3b) and (3c), respectively. 1996b , 2002 Goddard 1992 Goddard , 1997 Goddard , 2000 Goddard and Wierzbicka 1997) -specialised in that they concern culture-specific "ways with words" rather than other aspects of speaking or thinking. Before this, however, I want to highlight and dramatise my proposition that active metaphorising, as characterised so far, is a culture-specific speech practice and that it needs to be understood within an ethnopragmatic perspective. For readers with a knowledge of the wide variation in culturally based speech practices, this claim may seem unremarkable, but it is worth reminding ourselves that metaphorising has often been considered, in Jerry Morgan's (1993: 132) words, a "natural function of the mind". Even today one commonly reads studies which discuss production and interpretation of metaphors in English (or other European languages) entirely without reference to cultural context.
Two ethnopragmatic case studies
To underline the culture-specificity of English active metaphorising, I will give partial ethnopragmatic sketches of two non-Western cultures: Pitjantjatjara/Yankunkunytjara and Malay. In traditional Pitjantjatjara/Yankunkunytjara culture active metaphorising was virtually nonexistent, despite a proliferation of other speech practices involving metalexical awareness. In traditional Malay culture there was an abundant use of imagistic language which might seem at first to be metaphorical in nature, but on closer examination turns out to be radically different in character.
The marginality of active metaphor in Pitjantjatjara/Yankunytjatjara
Pitjantjatjara and Yankunytjatjara (henceforth P/Y) are closely related dialects of the Western Desert Language, still spoken as a first language in the arid and sparsely populated central and western interior of Australia (Goddard 1985 (Goddard , 1996 Eckert and Hudson 1988) . The traditional culture is replete with symbolism (totemism) and religious myth. There are hundreds of Dreaming stories, songs, and ceremonies. There is a large body of traditional folktales for children. There is a hortatory rhetoric (alpiri), elaborate verbal indirectness practised with certain categories of kin, well-developed practices of insult and abuse, and prescribed 'joking relationships' (Goddard 1992) . There is an auxiliary language (a special vocabulary, anitji) used during ceremonial times. (i.e. solid and reliable); 'this school is like a tree' (i.e. in time it will grow and bear good fruit); 'English is the key' (i.e. if we can learn English properly, we will be able to do things ourselves).
Two more novel examples of active simile follow 9 . Example (6) comes from a publication celebrating the 10-year anniversary of the achievement of Pitjantjatjara Land Rights. The speaker has been reminding people of the progress toward community selfmanagement which has been achieved in this ten years, and urges them to continue.
Example (7) From now you can practise other things. Like a football player learning the rules. They divided it up and hold onto it as if with strings. There's one string from over there going to one corner, another to another corner, another to another corner, and we (i.e. Aboriginal people) are all in the middle.
I believe that active metaphorising in contemporary P/Y is a result of culture contact.
Part of the influence is non-linguistic in nature. The encroaching Europeans have brought about substantial changes in lifestyle and economy and introduced a host of new institutions and alien concepts which call for explication and exposition-functions for which metaphor and simile can be extremely valuable. But there has also been, from almost the earliest days of sustained culture contact, a continuous training in metaphorical interpretation provided by missionary efforts to convey the Bible message in Pitjantjatjara.
Translation of the New Testament began with the founding of the Ernabella Mission in the early 1940s, and continues to this day. Church services (including hymns and sermons) and community preaching have been carried out in Pitjantjatjara, by both European missionaries and Pitjantjatjara people themselves, for over 50 years (cf. Goddard 1990) .
Many of the current Pitjantjatjara elders have attended numerous Bible study workshops.
All these activities involve explicit training in the interpretation of metaphor, simile and parable because, as everyone knows, the Bible is full of figurative language (God the Father, God as a shepherd 10 , the Kingdom of God, turn the other cheek, enter through the narrow gate, etc.). In particular, many of the key sayings of Jesus are framed in figurative language, making it almost impossible to speak the 'language of Christianity' without employing culturally unfamiliar metaphors. For example, in a Pitjantjatjara sermon recorded by Paul Eckert in 1978, the following metaphors were used: 'John the Baptist came to make straight the roads'; 'John said: God will winnow, separating the grain from the chaff'; 'John the Baptist was a voice in the wilderness'; 'John said: God has a scythe (axe) with which he will cut everybody down'. In each case, some explanation accompanied the metaphorical expression. Sometimes it was only a sentence or two, as in (8), at other times a quite extensive explanation with much restatement and repetition, as in (9).
(8) John-nga papatjatjanya paluru nganmanypa pitjangu, iwarankunytjikitja, anangu tjutangka tjukurpa palya tjakultjunkunytjikitja, tjana kulira piiwiyaringkula kampa kutjuparira papatjaitjirinytjaku.
John the Baptist had come before, to make the road (path), to tell people the good news, so that they would repent (think and feel shame), change their ways, and be baptised. Of course, even if the discourse of Christianity was the initial and major catalyst for the increase in metaphorising, there must have been other sources also, such as participation in the Western health and education systems.
From the P/Y situation we can draw the following two lessons, which both highlight the culture-specificity of active metaphorising. First, a culture can be at once a highly 'verbal culture' and yet still accord only a marginal role to active metaphorising, and, second, active metaphorising, like other cultural practices, can be transferred in the process of culture contact and adaptation.
The 'imagery of allusion' in Malay
We find an equally instructive situation with Malay (Bahasa Melayu), the national language of Malaysia. At first blush, everyday usage in old style or traditional Malay seems to be overflowing with exuberant and poetic metaphors, but closer inspection shows that the situation is quite different.
One of the classic colonial commentaries on traditional Malay society, Henri Fauconnier's (1990 Fauconnier's ( [1931 ) The Soul of Malaya, contains the following passage.
Imagine, for example the following dialogue between two young Malays. The subject is a green coconut. What can they have to say on such a matter? Listen: Osman, with downcast eyes, but with assurance: "Where do the leeches come from?" And he sighs.
Mat shakes his head reflectively: "The hook is broken."
Osman protests: "Would a lamp be lit?"
And Mat answers with a cruel laugh: "The sugar cane on the opposite bank is very sweet..." (Fauconnier 1990 (Fauconnier [1931 : 124) It certainly sounds poetic and metaphorical, does it not? In a sense it is, but in a very different way to metaphor in English. Explaining Osman and Mat's exchange, Fauconnier tells us that the green coconut represents a beautiful girl. Osman is confessing to his friend that he has a crush on this girl ("Where do the leeches come from?"). Mat's response is not encouraging: you have no chance, he tells his friend ("The hook is broken"). But she's been making eyes at me, Osman protests ("Would a lamp be lit?").
That kind of thing can't be trusted, Mat answers him ("The sugar cane on the opposite bank is very sweet").
Where does all this come from? The answer depends on the existence of a shared large corpus of short traditional Malay verses (pantuns), along with a large number of other proverbial sayings and maxims (peribahasa).
In the Malay dialogue ... all is allusion. It would be incomprehensible if one did not know the pantun of the leeches that come from the marshes into the rice fields; the pantun in which the sugar-cane of the other bank symbolises illusion or treachery; the pantuns of the hook and of the lamp.... (Fauconnier 1990 (Fauconnier [1931 :
126)
At least three of the pantuns to which Fauconnier refers are still well-known today-see below. Pantuns consist of a four-line verse in two parts, with an abab rhyme scheme. The first couplet (the pembayang 'foreshadower') generally depicts a concrete scene or event, often from nature. The second couplet expresses a clearer message (the maksud 'meaning') usually from the internal world of thoughts, values and feelings. Reading them, one can see at once how Osman and Mat's references to leeches, the lamp, and the sugar cane work.
Pantun of the leeches (Sim 1982: 56-7) :
Dari mana datangnya lintah?
From whence come the leeches?
Dari sawah turun ke kali, From the swamp to the ricefields.
Dari mana datangnya cinta?
From whence comes this love?
Dari mata turun ke hati?
From the eyes down to the heart.
Pantun of the lamp (Daille 1988: 44; Hamilton 1941: 22; Sim (1982: (Sim 1982: 36) ), but the pembayang can also draw on a large stock of images with conventionalised meanings or suggestions of meaning. For example, bunga (flower) a girl;
karam di laut (wrecked at sea, a ship wreck) a broken love or marriage; bunga kiambang (hyacinth) a love which cannot take root; tupai (squirrel) the village seducer; galah jolok (fruit-getting pole) someone reaching for something he can't get; buah rumbia (sago fruit) something which is second best. Some of these images are fairly transparent even to the cultural outsider, but others assume more detailed local knowledge; for example, that the bunga kiambang is a floating water flower, which lacks roots. In short, as Sim (1982: 13) says: "[T]o enjoy the pantun one must learn something of its special symbols, just as one has to learn the meaning of many gestures to be able to understand the language of mime in classical ballet".
So when commentators such as Asmah (1995) say that the pantun can be seen as " a microcosm of Malay social communication", what is meant is that the culture at large
favours subtlety and refinement of expression, the choice of a few well-chosen words which imply a great deal more than they express directly. To a great extent, this preference for subtle, indirect expression is motivated by the cultural importance attached to anticipating the feelings of other people and avoiding anything which could impinge on another person's feelings of dignity and self-esteem (cf. Goddard 1997 Goddard , 2000 The body suffers because of the mouth.
A final source of allusive language is metonymic association. For example, a special kind of rice dish (nasi minyak 'rice cooked in ghee') is served at weddings. To inquire of a friend whether she is planning to get married in the near future, one could therefore say something like (11).
(11) Dengar khabar tak lama lagi nak makan nasi minyak.
(I) heard that soon we'll be eating nasi minyak.
As Asmah (1995: 54) says, a person would be embarrassed to be asked "straight in his face", i.e. using 'plain words', whether it is true that he or she is getting married. The thing to do is therefore to use an ostensively 'round about' expression. On the other hand, the meaning of the acceptable expression is perfectly clear in context.
We are now in a position to sum up the portfolio of Malay assumptions and values which underlie and motivate the use of allusive language, including apparently poetic and imagistic language. It should be abundantly clear that the traditional Malay speech culture was full of metalexical awareness-but a metalexical awareness which was turned to very different purposes to that of Anglo culture. The goals were not expressiveness or expository clarity, but rather a concern for appropriate word use in the interests of sensitivity and propriety.
Even when apparently poetic or imagistic words were used, the culture-internal rationale and effect were very different to what one would expect on Anglo (or Western) assumptions.
Explicating the meanings of English active metaphors
I now want to return to English active metaphors of the expository kind, i.e. the kind with the ethnopragmatic motivation set out in script (5 Fernandez' (1986) 'structural metaphor'. Although the contrast between 'similarity' and 'analogy' is not sufficient in itself to establish a categorical difference (because, as pointed out to me by Gerard Steen, one can always reanalyse similarity metaphors into analogical structures), I have the sense that the distinction has some validity in terms of the complexity of the inferencing which is required to establish the grounds of comparison. In any case, for expository purposes it will be useful to examine a couple of examples of each type.
In the first category, the predication is often made "on the basis of a similarity in FEELING TONE-'glowering' clouds, a 'brooding' landscape, a 'Dyseptic' bureaucracy" (Fernandez 1986 : 38; emphasis added). For example, consider the use of the words soft and graceful in the following exchange from a dinner party conversation about wine (Lehrer 1983 As Wierzbicka (1996: 248-9 ) points out, the words soft and graceful, in this context, are being used to express the speaker's assessment of the kind of "pleasurable experience" brought about by the taste of this particular wine. They achieve this by a kind of implicit simile, whose effect can be made explicit in semantic explications: The next examples belong to the second traditional category -analogic or proportional metaphor. Because the basis for the analogy has to be inferred by the listener (making it, in Eco's (1984: 100) words, "a tool of cognition"), many writers on analogic metaphor have stressed that the possibilities for interpretation are open-ended. I disagree. Although the grounds of comparison are left inexplicit, the speaker nonetheless intends some specific relationship to be inferred by the listener (and this is assumed by listeners also).
An expository metaphor is therefore a bit like a riddle: there is a right answer which one either understands or does not. And one cannot understand the riddle (or the metaphor) until one has figured out the grounds. Of course, it is possible for there to be more than one interpretation (just as some riddles have more than one answer) and many poetic metaphors are no doubt like this, but expository metaphors generally only have one solution.
The explications below are intended to model the speaker's intended meaning, which (all going well) would correspond to the listener's final interpretation of what the speaker said. In Gibbs' (1993) terms, they are intended to model the product, not the process. In Cameron's (1999) terms, my account is at the 'theory' rather than the 'processing' level.
I would also like to acknowledge Cameron's (1999: 16) point that there are dangers in using "isolated, nominal, clause-length metaphors as typical exemplars", given the evidence that verbal metaphors may be more common than nominal metaphors in many kinds of discourse.
Unemployment is a contagious disease. This is a statement made by Neil Kinnock at a time when he was leader of the British Labor Party. What exactly did he mean? What I think he meant can be stated in fairly simple, non-metaphoric terms, as in (16) below. The idea seems to be that if some people cannot get jobs something happens (presumably, a general reduction in productive economic activity) which has a snowballing effect, so that other people would not be able get jobs either
13
. (In a more detailed explication, the complex word 'jobs' would obviously have to be further explicated.)
The explication has a three-part structure. The past is a foreign country. The basic idea behind this metaphor is that we lack an experiential base to understand the thinking of people in distant times, just as we lack such an experiential base in relation to life in a country in which we do not live. Overarching these specific claims is the contention that to spell out ethnopragmatic scripts for active metaphorising and related speech practices, and equally, to specify the semantic content of particular metaphors, we must have a way of talking about meanings which is cross-linguistically neutral, i.e. a method of semantic representation which is not tied to the idiosyncracies of any particular language. The natural semantic metalanguage therefore opens new possibilities for metaphor research. suggests an emphasis on cross-cultural communication, whereas ethnopragmatics can equally well be done on a single language, including the home language of the researcher.
APPENDIX: PROPOSED SEMANTIC PRIMES (after Goddard and
3 In many cases, the speaker or author's real intended meaning may never be known with absolute certainty, so strictly speaking one ought to refer to the speaker's meaning as reconstructed or inferred by the listener or the analyst. 4 Goatly (1997) also draws attention to comments of this kind, under the heading of 'cotextual markers' of metaphor. However, neither Goatly (1997) nor Moon (1998) distinguish very carefully between specifically metalexical markers such as 'so to speak' and 'as it were', on the one hand, and other kinds of metalinguistic comments. Other proposed indicators for active metaphor which can be found in the literature include: (a) the observation that 'mixing' active metaphors leads to genuine semantic anomaly, whereas mixing fixed or dead metaphors usually results in little more than stylistic inelegance (often not even noticed by speaker and hearer); and (b) the observation that it doesn't usually make sense to respond to an active metaphor with a true-or-false evaluation, but rather with comments like 'that makes sense' or 'that's a stupid thing to say'. These indicators are valuable but they do not bear such a transparent relation to any definitional property of active metaphor as does the metalexical tag test.
5 While SAY is one of the oldest and best established semantic primes, WORDS is a relative newcomer. It was proposed in Wierzbicka (1996: 107-8 ) on the grounds that (i) there is an irreducible difference between saying something and saying some words; for example, between two sentences like 'X said something bad to Y' and 'X said some bad words to Y'; (ii) the notion of WORDS seems essential to explicating concepts such as names, counting, speech formulas, and magical formulas; (iii) it appears that an equivalent for WORDS is found in a wide variety of languages, including non-written languages, and polysynthetic languages. 6 In some languages, an allolex of SAY, often glossable as 'express', may be more natural in this context than the primary exponent of SAY itself.
7 As noted by one reviewer, script (5) would encompasses other modes of figurative language aside from metaphor, such as metonymic or synedochic language, if these are employed for reasons of "cognitive engagement". It is not clear, however, whether it is appropriate, for the purpose of spelling out the relevant ethnopragmatic knowledge, to specify this script further so that it would apply to metaphor alone, e.g. by building in the idea of similiarity or analogy. Such further refinement would, of course, be necessary to explicate the lexical semantics of the word metaphor. ngakani 'choke on', 'feel confined/stressed'. These are all fixed, lexicalised expressions (Goddard 1996) . The existence of these fixed expressions challenges the standard assumption that fixed metaphors arise from conventionalisation of active metaphors. It seems more likely that they originate in similes rather than metaphors.
